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Article 3

Clyde W. Summers*

Labor Law as the Century Turns:
A Changing of the Guard
Labor legislation in this and other countries has, for the last one
hundred-fifty years, taken many forms, but it has been rooted in a
basic premise and expressed a common purpose. The premise is that
individual workers lack the bargaining power in the labor market necessary to protect their own interests and to obtain socially acceptable
terms of employment. When there is such economic inequality, the
function of the law is to protect the weaker party.1
This was the explicit premise of the earliest legislation requiring
employees to be paid in cash instead of scrip redeemable only at company stores. The same premise and purpose was expressed in legislation adopted at the turn of the present century fixing maximum hours
of work and minimum wages, prohibiting child labor, requiring health
and safety protection, and mandating compensation for work injuries.
The law would not leave workers to merciless market forces, but
would come to their aid as the weaker party and shield them from the
over-reaching economic strength of the employer.2
This same basic premise and central purpose motivates labor law
today. Society cannot understand where it has been or where it may
be going without awareness of that motivating force. The continuing
question is how we shall protect employees from socially unacceptable
Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; B.S. 1939, J.D. 1942, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1946, J.S.D. 1952, Columbia University.
1. See generally J. COMMONs & J. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION
(4th rev. ed. 1936).
But in any modem industrial community, large numbers of unorganized
workers are found, still bargaining individually, employed at low wages
and apparently unable to make any effective efforts themselves to improve their condition. If they are to be helped toward an equality in bargaining power with the employer, the state must take the initiative.
Id. at 43.
2.
In this opinion [Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)] the court recognized, what has been dimly seen or implied from the beginning of labor
legislation, that inequality of bargaining power is a justification under
which the state may come to the protection of the weaker party to the
*

Inequality of bargaining power has long been a ground for
bargain ....
legislative and judicial protection of the weaker party ....
J. COMiONS & J. ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 529.
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treatment by market forces where they lack the bargaining power to
protect themselves.
This question has two parts. First, who shall act as guard to protect
their interests? Second, what interests are to be protected? The Na3
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935 (also known as the Wagner Act)
responded to both of those questions with a single answer-collective
bargaining. The Act declared that national policy should encourage
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. The intolerable
inequality of the individual labor market was to be remedied by creat4
ing a collective labor market.
There was no assumption that collective bargaining would provide
perfect parity, even if perfect parity could be defined. The assumption
was that the collective labor market would give the worker enough
increased bargaining power to produce socially acceptable results.
Employees, acting through a representative of their own choosing,
would be their own guardian, and the interests protected would be
those negotiated in the collective agreement.
Collective bargaining was conceived to serve two additional political and social purposes. First, by establishing a collective labor market with more equal bargaining power, collective bargaining reduced
the need for government regulation to protect employees from oppressive terms. Collective bargaining was seen as the alternative to legislation prescribing terms and conditions of employment.5 Second,
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982).
4.
Long ago we stated the reasons for labor organizations. We said that
they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single
employee was helpless in dealing with an employer... that union was
essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.... Fully recognizing the legality of collective action on the
part of employees in order to safeguard their proper interests, we said
that Congress was not required to ignore this right but could safeguard
it.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937) (citation omitted).
See also Frey, The National Labor Relations Act Should Not be Amended at the
Present Session of Congress, 33 ILL. L. REV. 658 (1939).
5. Senator Wagner argued that the National Labor Relations Act constituted "the
only key to the problem of economic stability if we intend to rely upon democratic self-help by industry and labor, instead of courting the pitfalls of an arbitrary or totalitarian state." J. HUTHMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND
THE RISE OF URBAN LIBERALISM 195 (1968).

Stating it more fully, Senator Wagner declared:
Modern nations have selected one of two methods to bring order into
industry. The first is to create a super-government. Under such plan,
labor unions are abolished or become the creatures of the state. Trade
associations become the cartels of the state.... That is what is called the
authoritarian state.... The second method of coordinating industry is
the democratic method. It is entirely different from the first. Instead of
control from the top, it insists upon control from within. It places the
primary responsibility where it belongs and asks industry and labor to
solve their mutual problems through self-government. That is industrial
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collective bargaining provided a measure of industrial democracy by
giving employees a voice in decisions which influenced their lives. It
extended democracy to the workplace, freeing employees from the
unilateral dictates of management and the remote unresponsiveness
6
of governmental agencies.
I.
The basic assumption of the National Labor Relations Act was that
the labor market would be regulated by collective bargaining, not by
legislation. Workers would be protected by their union, not by government officials. Workers' rights would be guaranteed by the collective agreement, not by the law. Those rights would be defined and
enforced through grievance procedures and arbitration, not through
administrative agencies or courts.
This assumption dominated our thinking in labor law for nearly
fifty years. For example, the declared purpose of the Taft-Hartley
Act7 was to adjust the balance between union and management so as
to produce more socially desireable results, and to make collective
agreements enforceable in the federal courts. The purpose of the Landrum-Griffin Acts was to protect democratic processes in unions so
they would better serve their purpose of providing a measure of industrial democracy.
One of the inevitable, though unremarked, consequences of this reliance on collective bargaining was to preclude consideration of legislation protecting substantive rights. For nearly thirty years the only
significant legislation was the Fair Labor Standard Act, passed in 1938,
which was conceived largely to provide a floor to support collective
bargaining. 9
democracy, and upon its success depends the preservation of the American way of life.
L. SILVERBERG, THE WAGNER AcT: AFTER TEN YEARS 13 (1945).

6. Senator Wagner explained the philosophy of the Act in these terms:
The principles of my proposal were surprisingly simple. They were
founded upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as in government; that democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives
and livelihood; and that the workers in our great mass production industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDusTRmIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965 321
(1970) (quoting N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20, col.1).
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 144-187 (1982).
8. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187, 401-402, 411-415, 431-440, 461-466, 481-483, 501-504,
521-531 (1982).
9. Although Wagner pressed for the Fair Labor Standards Act, he considered it
"merely the foundation upon which can be built the mutual efforts of revived
industry and a rehabilitated labor .... To expect the government to do more

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:7

Collective bargaining, where established, served its intended purposes. It provided a tolerable balance of bargaining power in most situations. Collective agreements not only established wage rates and
benefits, but also defined rights of employees in the workplace and
provided, through grievance procedures and arbitration, a system for
adjudicating and enforcing those rights. Through their union, employees obtained a voice in many decisions affecting their working lives.
To be sure, strikes sometimes disrupted production, but this was the
price of market bargaining, free from government control.
The visible success of collective bargaining, its domination in major
manufacturing and transportation industries, and the publicized
drama of negotiations and strikes obscured the fact that the Wagner
Act failed to achieve its purpose. Collective bargaining never became
established except in segments of industry. The majority of employees were not covered by collective agreements but remained subject to
the inequalities of individual bargaining. Instead of expanding, collective bargaining began shrinking in relation to total employment in the
early 1950's. It now covers less than 25% of private employment and
continues to shrink.10
Why collective bargaining has not been more widely extended is,
for present purposes, unimportant. The significant fact is that collective bargaining does not regulate the labor market. Unions and collective agreements do not guard employees from the potential
deprivations and oppressions of employer economic power. The consequence is foreseeable, if not inevitable; if collective bargaining does
not protect the individual employee, the law will find another way to
protect the weaker party."' The law, either through the courts or the
legislatures, will become the guardian. Labor law is now in the midst
of that changing of the guard. There is current recognition that if the
majority of employees are to be protected, it must be by the law prewould run the risk of creating a 'despotic state.'" The major reliance must be left
to private labor management relations "worked out on the basis of true equality
of representation. That is why the cultivation of collective bargaining is not
merely an abstract matter of freedom for the worker, Wagner insisted, but rather
a concrete foundation for the general welfare." J. HU'HMACHER, supranote 5,at
203-04.
10. In 1946, union membership reached its peak strength with 35% of non-agricultural workers in unions. N. CHAMBERLAIN, D. CULLEN, & D. LEWIN, THE LABOR
SECTOR 124 (3d ed. 1980). The number covered by collective agreements was
somewhat larger. In 1978, with 22.3% of the labor force in unions and employee
associations, collective agreements covered 29.7% of non-agricultural employees.
By 1981, only 20.9% of the labor force were members of unions or employee associations. Summers, Past Premises,Present Failures,and FutureNeeds in Labor Legislation,31 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 15 (1982). Present union membership has
dropped to 17.5%. 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 124:140 (March 2, 1987).
11. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
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scribing at least certain rights of employees and minimum terms and
conditions of employment.
II.
The trend might be traced back to the Equal Pay Act of 196312 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964.13 Discrimination was recognized as an intolerable social evil which cried out for correction. Collective bargaining provided little promise of improvement, for even
where collective bargaining was established, discriminatory practices
persisted. Even where national unions had strong antidiscrimination
policies, those policies were flaunted by local unions who built into
their collective agreements perpetuations of employer discriminatory
practices. The Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
were aimed in part at collective agreement evils rather than those existing because of the lack of collective agreements.
More responsive to the failure to establish collective bargaining
was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.14 Seniority
provisions in collective agreements provided older workers significant
protection against dismissal, and hiring halls in some industries provided some protection against age discrimination in hiring employees.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act helped those not covered
by collective agreements. In practical operation, its major impact has
been to protect those not reached by the collective bargaining system.
The clearest legislative break came in 1970 with the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA).15 This legislation comprehensively
regulated a major mandatory subject of bargaining, one which was
central to bargaining in industries such as coal. OSHA was especially
well suited for the flexible and particularized process of plant level
regulation through collective bargaining and the grievance procedure.
The legislation, most strongly urged by the unions themselves, was not
aimed at strengthening the bargaining process but at protecting all
employees, including those outside collective bargaining. The statute
provided special roles for the "representative of employees" in reporting, inspecting, and enforcing, but this role was not limited to the majority union representative; it extended to minority and informally
selected (if not self-appointed) "representatives." The driving force
was the recognition that collective bargaining had failed to provide adequate protection of employee health and safety. The law and legal
institutions had to become guardians.
Following OSHA, the Employment Retirement Income Security
12.
13.
14.
15.

29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)17 (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).

12
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Act of 197416 protected employees' pension rights, including rights
which could have been protected through collective bargaining. But
again, collective bargaining had not, and could not, provide the needed
protection because most employee pension plans were not reached by
collective bargaining.
All of these federal statutes included provisions protecting employees from retaliatory discrimination or discharge for reporting violations, instituting proceedings, testifying, or providing information
concerning violations. Similar provisions have been included in other
federal regulatory statutes such as the Clean Air Act,17 the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Act,18 the Hazardous Substances Release
(Superfund) Act,19 the Safe Drinking Water Act, 20 and the Solid
Waste Disposal Act.2 1 All of the conduct covered by these statutes
was protected by "just cause" clauses in collective agreements where
collective bargaining was established.
These statutes regulating employment relations were the first hidden signs of a break in our national policy of relying on collective bargaining to regulate the labor market. The unmistakable signal came
with the sudden judicial fracturing of the employment at will
doctrine.
Some small cracks in the employment at will doctrine opened in
the mid-1970's. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.22 upheld a contract action
by a woman who was discharged for refusing to date her foreman.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that "termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation ...constitutes a breach of
23
the employment contract."
In Framptonv. Central Indiana Gas Co.,24 the Supreme Court of
Indiana upheld a tort action by an employee who was discharged for
filing a workmen's compensation claim. The court endorsed the employment at will doctrine, but declared: "[W]hen an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right, an
exception to the general rule must be recognized." 25
In Nees v. Hocks,26 the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a tort suit by
a secretary based on an alleged wrongful discharge. The plaintiff was
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-9(i) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 6971(a) (1982).
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
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discharged because she did not try to get herself excused from serving
on a jury. The discharge, said the court, contravened values "high on
the scale of American institutions and citizen obligations" and constituted a legal wrong.27
Finally, in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.,28 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld the complaint of a discharged waitress
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and a separate complaint by her husband for loss of consortium. The employer announced that stealing was going on but that he did not know who was
responsible. Until he discovered the responsible person, the employer
threatened to discharge the waitresses in alphabetical order. The
plaintiff was first on 'the list and was subsequently fired. The court
held that the lower court's dismissal was in error because there were
sufficient facts in the complaint to support a jury question as to
whether the discharge was "extreme and outrageous [and] utterly intolerable in a civilized community" 29 as proscribed by Section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Within five years, courts in other states had opened gaping holes in
the employment at will doctrine. .The public'policy exception was enlarged by the Illinois Supreme Court to protect from discharge a managerial employee who supplied police with information that another
employee might be violating the criminal code and agreed to gather
further evidence.3 0 The Connecticut Supreme Court protected a quality control employee from discharge who reported to his employer the
use of substandard materials and incorrect labelling.3 1 The covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was used by the California Court of Appeals to give an employee an action in both tort and contract when he
was discharged after eighteen years of service without good cause and
without notice and hearing as provided in the company's regulations.s2
The contract of employment was given added substance by the Michigan Supreme Court which incorporated into the contract the provisions in employee handbooks and personnel policy manuals that
stated grounds for discharge and described procedures for handling
33
grievances and terminations.
Although not all courts have recognized exceptions or limitations
to the employment at will doctrine, courts in thirty-two states have
adopted public policy exceptions, eleven states have applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and twenty-nine states have used
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319.
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlM.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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employee handbooks to find contractual limitations on terminations3 4
A total of thirty-nine states now employ one or more theories to qualify the employment at will doctrine.35
These court decisions have been paralleled by a wide variety of
state statutes protecting whistleblowers, prohibiting retaliatory discharges, and protecting the exercise of various personal, legal, or political rights. 36 Within the last year, Montana has enacted the first state
statute providing general protection against "wrongful discharge."3 7
This statute was designed to prohibit retaliation for the employee's
refusal to violate public policy, for reporting a violation of public policy, and for violations of express provisions of the employer's written
personnel policy. Broad dismissal statutes have also been adopted in
Puerto Rico3s and the Virgin Islands. 39
In addition, states have passed a variety of statutes protecting a
wide range of employee rights other than the right not to be unjustly
discharged. Various statutes prohibit employers from requiring polygraph tests, limit drug testing, impose confidentiality on employee
records, require that employees be given access to their personnel file
and the right to have errors corrected, require posted notices of job
hazards and toxic substances, require smoke free work areas, and require employees be given notice of plant closings.4 0 A Maine statute
requires that the employer not only give 60 days notice of a plant closing, but also requires that it pay severance pay to the employees
dismissed.41
III.
An overview of this process of judicial and legislative regulation
suggests three general characteristics. First, equivalent protection of
employees could be, and often is, encompassed in collective agreements. Provisions requiring just cause for discipline or discharge are
included as a matter of course in most agreements, and those provisions give employees much more comprehensive and effective protection than court decisions or legislation. Other judicial and statutory
protections cover the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining and
frequently appear in collective agreements or are found by arbitrators
34. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505: 51-2 (Jan. 1988).
35. Id.
36. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES app. A (1985).

37. Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, 1987 Mont. Laws ch. 641 (now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987)).

38. P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1985).
39. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 65 (1970).
40. Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 124: 67-81 (Feb. 2, 1987).
41. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (1987).

19881

A CHANGING OF THE GUARD

to be implied in the agreement. Although the decision to close a plant
may not be a mandatory subject, the parties are free to bargain about
it. Collective agreements may include provisions requiring employers
to give advance notice of closings, and severance pay is clearly a
mandatory subject. Collective bargaining, where it is established and
accepted, can provide almost all of the employee protection now provided by court decisions and legislation. Labor counted on collective
bargaining to provide this protection, but the protection has been incomplete. Society is now looking to the courts and legislatures to protect employees not covered by collective bargaining. Labor law is in
the midst of a changing of the guard.
The second characteristic of the judicial and legislative changes is
that the interests protected are primarily non-economic interests in
fairness, personal dignity, privacy, and physical integrity. Protection
against unjust discharge focuses more on substantive and procedural
fairness and personal dignity than on the economic value of the job.
Cases enforcing the handbook as a contract or invoking the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing look to the expectations of the employee,
adherence to stated rules and procedures, and fundamental fairness.
In tort cases, the damages for mental suffering and punitive damages
are frequently much more than the lost wages. Limitations on polygraph and drug testing and the requirement of confidentiality of
records recognize the rights of privacy; protection of whistleblowers
recognizes the value of personal integrity; and requiring notice of
hazards and toxic chemicals recognizes the employees' interest in
physical integrity. The Supreme Court's reading of OSHA as "'placing the benefit' of worker health above all other considerations"42 to
the extent feasible and rejecting an economic cost-benefit analysis is
both symbolic and significant.
The third characteristic is that the courts and legislatures have
built on an underlying assumption, more nascent than fully developed,
that the employee has a valuable interest in his or her job which ought
not be arbitrarily taken away. This assumption is implicit in the
breakdown of the employment at will doctrine, for it is the courts'
sense of that valuable interest which spurs them to develop legal theories which will provide protection. This assumption is explicit in the
Montana statute prohibiting discharge without good cause, 43 and in
the advocacy of such legislation in other states. It is also implicit in
the plant closing statutes such as the Maine statute,44 which requires
payment of severance pay to employees who lose their jobs. The
United States is witnessing an evolving legal recognition of the employee's property right in his or her job, an interest which is of crucial
42. American Textile ifrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
43. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-B (Supp. 1987).
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personal and economic importance to the individual. As such, it is entitled to broad legal protection.
IV.
What does this decreasing reliance on collective bargaining and increasing reliance on the law to regulate the labor market bode for the
future? My crystal ball is clouded, so I am uncertain whether I am
seeing inside the ball or only my own reflection. However, I would
like to suggest the directions in which labor law will move as the century turns.
First, the prospects are for continued proliferation of judicial and
legislative regulation of the labor market. The deeper economic, social, and political forces which have brought labor law to where it is
now will not reverse. The unequal bargaining position of most individual workers will continue or become more acute as the number of low
wage workers in the service trades increases, robots in industry dilute
or obsolesce skills, and computers transform white collar workers into
mechanical appendages in bureaucratic organizations. There will be
an increased need to protect employees from their helplessness in individual bargaining. One might hope that there would be a political
and social recommitment to collective bargaining with a realization by
employers that joint self-regulation is preferable to legal regulation,
but all signs point in the opposite direction. Even if there is a rebirth
of collective bargaining, society will not return to delusive reliance on
it as the sole guardian.
The felt need to protect employees' rights in the workplace will
spur courts to extend legal theories and develop new remedies. Judicial decisions in one state will continue to break paths for decisions in
other states as the employment at will cases have shown. Legislative
initiatives in one state will encourage similar legislation in other
states, as plant closing laws have demonstrated. The Montana statute
on unjust dismissal4 5 will almost certainly be followed by parallel stat46
utes in other states, just as the Michigan whistleblower statute
47
48
seeded statutes in Connecticut, Maine,
and a number of other
states 49 In the same way, legislation concerning polygraph and drug
testing, access to personnel files, and notice of job hazards will
proliferate.
Passage of these statutes will generate demand for protecting other
employee rights. We should be able to read the handwriting on the
45.
46.
47.
48.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.369 (West 1981).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(a) (West 1987).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (Cure. Supp. 1987).

49. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:21 (May 1987).
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wall, not only in legislation already enacted in the states, but in proposals now being pressed at both the state and federal level-protection of the employment rights of AIDS carriers, limitations on
exposure to video screens, restrictions on computer surveillance of
employees, and requirements for pregnancy and parental leaves.
Second, labor law in the future will likely continue to focus on personal rights of employees rather than on economic terms of wages and
benefits. The political and social pressures which have pushed forward the recent court decisions and legislation reflect deeply felt values and needs, and there are no compelling arguments why those
values should not be realized and those needs fulfilled.
General arguments against big government and legal regulation
have limited persuasiveness when personal rights are being protected.
Most employees do not look upon laws preserving their privacy, upholding their personal dignity, shielding their personal safety, and insuring them fairness of treatment and security in their jobs as
encroachments on their freedoms. Workers are more likely to view
such laws as a caring government getting employers off their backs.
Arguments that such laws will hamper American industry in competing in the world market will carry little weight in the future, for
most of these legal protections impose no substantial economic costs
on the employer. Recognition of the employee's privacy costs the employer no more than foregoing inquiry into matters having little impact on productive efficiency. Notice of hazardous substances in the
workplace imposes only minor administrative burdens unless employers are endangering the health of their employees. Pregnancy and parental leaves cause some dislocations, but seldom beyond the capacity
of capable management. These leaves cause substantially fewer dislocations than temporary layoffs, which are accepted as commonplace.
Limitation of the employment at will doctrine requires only fairness; it does not require keeping unproductive employees. Indeed,
fairness and job security may improve employee morale, and with it,
increase productivity. At the very least, requiring fair procedures and
good cause may prevent hasty, ill-considered, and unnecessary loss of
potentially valuable employees in whose training the employer has a
substantial investment. The employers' nearly universal acceptance
of such employee rights in collective bargaining suggests that fairness
in discipline is not overly costly to employers. Even requiring employers to give notice of plant closings and severance pay places little burden on the employers' ability to compete in the world market. The
willingness of some states to pass such legislation expresses the view
that the costs are not substantial enough to place businesses in those
states at a competitive disadvantage.
Required notice of plant closing imposes no burden on employers
beyond a minimum of advance planning and increased pressure by
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employees and the community to justify the decision. Severance pay
imposes a limited burden because it is a one-time payment and is assessed only against those minority of employers who close their plants.
Neither the requirement of notice nor severance pay puts American
employers at a competitive disadvantage with employers in Western
Europe or Japan, for those countries have long had such legislation.
The protection most costly to employers is safety and health regulations, but the high value society places on physical integrity will continue to outweigh concern for increased costs attributable to safety
and health. These legal protections are quite unlike proposals to require employers to provide medical insurance, day care centers, or
other economic benefits which add substantially to labor costs. At the
state level, legislators will be reluctant to place such burdens on their
state's businesses and put them at a competitive disadvantage with
businesses in other states.
Third, the proliferation of legal protection of employee rights will
greatly increase the complexity of labor law through the turn of the
century. The employment at will cases provide an introductory warning. Courts, without any contribution from the legislatures, have created complex legal theories in both contract and tort as well as hybrid
theories such as "good faith and fair dealing," "public policy," and
"abusive discharge." In addition, the discharged employee may sue for
defamation, fraudulent representation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and restraint of competition.5 0 Ten years ago the law
of employment at will could be adequately summarized in five pages;
now it generates five hundred page textbooks and scores of law review
articles. Employment at will law is now the centerpiece of weekend
continuing legal education conferences and feeds a looseleaf service of
some 200 pages a month. Legislation concerning this and other employee rights will make this complex judge-made framework seem
simple and coherent, for legislation will almost certainly be a combination of federal, state, and even local regulations. Each statute will
have not only its own unique body of substantive rules, but also its
own administrative procedures and remedies. Present legislation
gives no reason to hope that there will be any consistent pattern or
systematic coordination. Labor law will increasingly change from a
troublesome thicket to an impenetrable jungle.
The most difficult problem of the near future will be reconciling
overlapping protections. The problem, in its simplest form, is illustrated by the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act.51 The Montana statute attempts to pre-empt "common law remedies" by stating that
"except as provided [in the statute] no claim for discharge may arise
50. See w. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 36, at ch. 7; see generally H. PERRrIT,
JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1987).
51. MONT.CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
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from tort or express or implied contract." 52 This leaves unclear
whether actions may be brought for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Other statutory causes of action at the federal, state, and even local level remain untouched. Instead of having
one primary guardian in collective bargaining, we now have multiple
legal guardians with potentially multiple causes of action. A commonplace example, again involving wrongful discharge, suggests the

possibilities.
A fifty-five year old woman is discharged after writing a letter to
the local newspaper disclosing that her employer is using toxic chemicals which she claims endangers the work area. She has potential recourse in least four forums: (1) the grievance procedure and
arbitration for unjust discharge under the collective agreement, if
there is one; (2) the EEOC for sex discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act, and for age discrimination under ADEA; (3) the Secretary
of Labor for retaliatory discharge under OSHA; and (4) the state court
for discharge violating the public policy protecting freedom of speech.
Suit on the EEOC charges will be in the federal district court, with the
sex discrimination claim tried by the judge and the age discrimination
claim tried by the jury. In both, the plaintiff may obtain reinstatement, damages, and lawyers' fees; but in the age discrimination claim
the plaintiff may receive double recovery with liquidated damages.
The state court will not order reinstatement or lawyers' fees, but may
allow damages for mental suffering and add punitive damages.
If the rights and remedies are considered cumulative, the course of
the plaintiff's lawyer is clear-proceed in any or all forums so as to
take advantage of the multiple chances of winning and the option of
taking the most favorable aspect of each result. Arbitration or administrative proceedings may achieve reinstatement and back pay; suit in
federal court will pay the legal costs; and suit in the state court may
add compensation for mental suffering and punitive damages. The
course of the employer's lawyer is equally clear-defend in each proceeding until all are exhausted and then send the employer the bill.
One can scarcely imagine an arrangement better designed to hold out
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich,
the lawyers, and clog the legal machinery. The bitter irony is that if
any of the employees were injured by the toxic chemical, they woule
not have a remedy except a workmen's compensation claim whic
1"
would pay only half of their economic loss.

The most difficult problems arise in determining whether the remedies are exclusive, and major attention thus far has focused on the
overlap of collective agreement remedies and legal protection. When
the legal rights arise under federal statutes, the answers seem rela52. Id. at § 39-2-913.
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tively clear. In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 53 the United States
Supreme Court held that remedies under grievance arbitration and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were cumulative. An employee had
separable rights under both the collective agreement and Title VII
which could be enforced separately. The fact that the employee's contract claim was denied in arbitration did not foreclose the vindication
of his statutory right in federal court.
This same principle was followed in Barrentinev. Arkansas-Best
FreightSystem, Inc.,54 in which the Supreme Court held that an employee, whose claim for overtime under the collective agreement was
denied in arbitration, was not barred from suing under the Wage-Hour
Law. "[T]he employee's claim", said the court, "is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guaran55
tees to individual workers."
This principle was echoed once again in Atchison, Topeka and
Sante Fe Ry. v. Buell,56 in which the Supreme Court held that a railroad employee who suffered emotional distress and mental breakdown because of a foreman's harassment and intimidation could sue
for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, even though
he could have prosecuted a grievance to arbitration to correct the
situation.
When there is an overlap between collective bargaining remedies
and state contract or tort remedies, the lines are unclear. Some light
was shed by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers, Inc. v. Lueck 57
which barred state tort action for a bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim under a collectively bargained disability plan. An implied
obligation of good faith, said the Court, was tightly bound with questions of contract interpretation because "nearly any alleged willful
breach of contract can be restated as a tort claim for breach of a goodfaith obligation under a contract."58 Tort actions would diminish the
central role of arbitration in interpreting the contract because the
same dispute that could be decided by the arbitrator would be decided
by the state court. This decision would seem to cast a cloud over suits
for wrongful discharge, particularly those based on contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing theories where there is a collective
agreement with a just cause discharge and arbitration clause.
But the lines have again become blurred. In Caterpillar,Inc. v.
Williams,59 the Supreme Court held that a state law complaint for
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
Id. at 737.
107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987).
105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
Id. at 1915.
107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987).
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breach of an individual contract of employment was not pre-empted
by the collective agreement. The promise of permanent employment
had been made when the employee was a supervisor outside the bargaining unit and was not a right "created by the collective bargaining
agreement" or "substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bar'gaining agreement." 60 The Court went on to state that "[a] plaintiff
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert
legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied on is not a collective bargaining agreement."6 1
The availability of dual remedies was further suggested in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts62 in which the Court declared: "It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its
head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to
join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor reg63
ulations imposing minimal standards on non-union members."
It is no surprise that the courts of appeal are in conflict on the
unjust discharge cases. Some, like the Seventh Circuit, have disregarded Caterpillarand Metropolitan Life by holding that all state
court remedies are pre-empted by the collective agreement, even
when the discharge violates state public policy and punitive damages
would be available in the state court. 64 Other courts have reached the
same result by reasoning that exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine were developed to protect employees who had no other protection.65 The availability of arbitration removes the reasons for the
exception, and courts should not provide a remedy.
On the other side, some courts have followed the Ninth Circuit and
held that state court remedies are not wholly pre-empted by collective
agreements. 66 The state court is not precluded from protecting its
own interests and enforcing its own public policy by providing a tort
remedy and punitive damages for those discharged in violation of the
state's public policy.6 7 This question of the relation between collective
Id. at 2431.
Id. at 2431-32 (emphasis in original).
105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
Id. at 2398.
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 226; see also Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1986).
65. Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 503 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. 1986).
66. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Herring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986); Peabody Gallon v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); cf. Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. See generally Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful DischargeActions, 8 IND. REL. L.J. 1 (1986); Herman, Wrongful DischargeActions
after Lueck and MetropolitanLife Insurance,9 IND. REL. L.J. 596 (1987).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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bargaining remedies and state tort remedies is now before the
Supreme Court, 68 but a decision in that case can at most provide a ray
of illumination on this small corner of overlapping remedies.
The overlap between grievance arbitration and federal or state
remedies is of limited practical importance because less than a fourth J
of all employees are covered by collective agreements. More difficult
are the overlaps between federal or state statutory remedies and common law remedies. Returning to the not so hypothetical fifty-five year
old whistleblower, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the availability of an administrative remedy for age discrimination precluded a
common law tort action, 6 9 and a California court has held that availability of a statutory remedy for retaliatory discharge under the state
workmen's compensation statute precluded a common law tort action.70 Beyond these issues are other questions such as whether federal administrative remedies for retaliatory discharge available under
OSHA preclude both state administrative and common law remedies.
Uncertainties as to whether the availability of one remedy precludes
another are matched by unraised questions of election of remedies
such as whether winning in one forum will bar seeking additional relief in another forum. Will our discharged woman, having won liquidated damages and lawyers' fees in her federal age discrimination
action, be allowed to pursue her state common law actions for mental
suffering and punitive damages?
These questions merely graze the surface of the complex problems
which will be raised by the proliferation of employment rights and
remedies. A signal flag of the future can be seen in the fact that during the last term of the Supreme Court, eight overlap or pre-emption
cases involving individual rights were decided. Two of those involving
the overlap of grievance arbitration and federal statutory or state common law remedies have already been discussed.71 The other six, set
out below, provide a glimpse of the problems to come.
In Perryv. Thomas,7 2 a California statute provided that actions for
unpaid wages could be brought in court without regard to any arbitration provision in the employment contract. The Supreme Court held
that this statute was pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act and
required the employee to arbitrate in accordance with a standard form
provision in his employment application. In Pilot Life Insurance v.
Dedeaux,73 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,74 individ68. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
69. Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985).
70. Portillo v. G.T. Price Prod., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 185, 182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982).
71. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987); Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987).
72. 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
73. 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987).
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ual employees claimed their disability benefits had been wrongfully
terminated by their employers' insurance companies. They sued the
insurance companies in state court for tortious breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement. The Court
held that these state contract and tort actions were barred by the
broad pre-emption provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
However, in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,75 the Supreme
Court held that the broad pre-emption provisions of ERISA did not
reach the Maine plant closing statute which required advance notice
of closing and payment of severance pay to employees who were dismissed. ERISA barred only state regulation of employee benefit
"plans," and the statute did not require the employer to establish or
maintain a "plan," but only make a one-time lump sum payment. Nor
was the statute pre-empted under the National Labor Relations Act,
"since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not impermissibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process."76
Two state statutes that point in quite opposite directions have been
upheld as not conflicting with federal prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or other related conditions. California
FederalSavings and Loan Associationv. Guerra77 upheld a state statute requiring employers to grant pregnancy leaves and to reinstate
those returning from leave. California was free to provide pregnant
employees more protection than provided by the federal statute, and
employers were not required by the state statute to give preference to
pregnant women, for employers could give equal benefits to other disabled workers.
In contrast, the Missouri Unemployment Compensation Act, which
classified women who left work due to pregnancy as quitting voluntarily and disqualified them from receiving unemployment benefits, was
78
upheld in Wimberly v. Labor and IndustrialRelations Commission.
The federal provision only prohibited singling out pregnant women
for unfavorable treatment, and Missouri disqualified all workers, male
or female, who left work "voluntarily and without good cause attributable to [her] work or to [her] employer." 79
My purpose here is not to analyze and rationalize these most recent
decisions on pre-emption. Indeed, they are probably impossible to rationalize in any systematic fashion, for the Court seems to be feeling
its way case by case. My point here is that these cases are a prelude to
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987).
107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
Id. at 2223.
107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
107 S. Ct. 821 (1987).
Id. at 823.
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the complex problems of overlap and pre-emption with which labor
law will have to struggle for at least the rest of the century. The earlier pre-emption cases8 0 already seem a game of checkers when compared to the blindfolded chess we are now playing; the game of the
future will be even more challenging.
V.
These are all predictions - my view of the direction labor law will
take as we change from relying on collective bargaining to relying on
the law to protect employees from their weakness in individual bargaining. Facing this future, what will be the needs of labor law in the
coming decades? What changes ought to be considered that will make
labor law more serviceable for workers and employers and enable it to
serve the larger political and social purposes which have motivated
labor law for one hundred and fifty years?
Three needs appear obvious. First, the problems associated with
overlapping rights and remedies and of multiple forums must be reduced. To have a single discharge litigated in four or more forums is
intolerable for the employer, the worker, and the legal system - for
everyone except lawyers. One possible course of action would be to
federalize all labor law and create a system of labor courts as a unified
forum. This, however, would depreciate the value of our federal system for it would block the states from having local variations, experimenting, or breaking new ground. A single specialized court might
cramp or distort the evolving law. Labor law cannot live or grow in
isolation; it must reflect general social and political values such as privacy, personal freedom, human dignity, and procedural fairness which
permeate other areas of the law. This is particularly true of the individual rights in employment which the law must increasingly protect.
I can propose no neat solution. Indeed, I fear that because of the
wide variety of rights to be protected and our hesitant legal recognition of them, the solution must be piecemeal and will inevitably be
incomplete. However, we should be able to arrive at a rough consensus as to what the appropriate remedies and measure of damages
should be so that they will not vary with the form of the action or the
chosen forum. Further, we should be able to reduce multiple litigation by requiring that all of the rights growing out of the same transaction be adjudicated in the same forum and that the judgment be
collateral estoppel on those rights. Some exceptions might be neces80. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

1988]

A CHANGING OF THE GUARD

sary where certain rights, such as those under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, would be effectively protected only in a special forum.
There are other ways of reducing overlap and complexity, including systematic efforts to draft statutory provisions that more clearly
define the relative priority of substantive rules and procedures. Few
statutes provide useful guidance on pre-emption problems, and when
they do, the pre-emption provisions are often inserted as an afterthought without any careful analysis or exploration of their potential
impact on the wide variety of concrete cases.
Second, more study and thought needs to be given to designing
remedies that will be effective, in practical terms, in making substantive employment rights real.s1 The individual's weakness in bargaining with the employer is matched with the individual's weakness in
litigating against the employer. Most workers do not have the price of
admission to the legal system. They cannot afford a lawyer, and most
claims are too small to produce a viable contingent fee. Awarding the
winning plaintiffs their legal costs helps, but it discourages lawyers
from taking cases which are doubtful or which may require developing
new theories or legal rules. Double damages, such as those awarded in
wage-hour suits, encourage the worker only minimally, because the
claims are small and do little to deter employers from systematically
underpaying their workers. Even in the unlikely event that an employer is successfully sued for half its violations, it still pays to violate
the statute. Use of administrative agencies to enforce employee rights
removes the burden of litigation from the worker, but our experience
with administrative agencies, as presently designed and empowered,
has found them wanting. Few neutral observers would characterize
the NLRB, EEOC, OSHA, or the Department of Labor as effective
guardians of employee rights.
Employment at will cases teach an additional lesson. Suits on implied contract theories are useful only for upper income employees
because contract damages will not support a lawsuit. Tort theories,
however, present a different picture. Damages for emotional distress
and punitive damages may provide awards which encourage aggressive
lawyers to accept such cases on a contingent fee and discourage employers from discharging employees without cause. In California, the
average jury verdict in wrongful discharge cases has been more than
$250,000, with some verdicts for more than $1,000,000.82 These awards,

however, conceal two matters of concern. First, most wrongfully discharged workers are unsuccessful in litigation, so the law becomes a
81. See generally Kornblau, Common Law Remediesfor Wrongfully DischargedEmployees 9 IND. REL. L.J. 596 (1987).
82. Quackenbush, 1985 Jury Verdicts, Wrongful Termination Cases (California),6
THE EMPLOYEE ADVOCATE 61 (Winter 1987); see also Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood"and "Goliath", 62 MICH. B.J. 776 (1983).
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lottery with a few big winners and many losers. Second, big awards
attract public attention and generate a reaction against limitations on
the employment at will doctrine and feed campaigns to reduce rather
than increase employee rights. Reflection might lead to the conclusion that it would be preferable to have substantive rules which
broaden the protection for more employees, with recoveries only for
economic losses. However, it is also important to design practical procedures and remedies for the employees which will effectively deter
violations by the employer.
Again, I am not prepared to present a solution; indeed, there may
be no fully satisfactory solution. However, the designing of remedies
which are more effective and appropriate is one of the most important
jobs to be done before the turn of the century. This job, like that of
reducing the problems of overlap, will require labor lawyers, academics, and judges to develop a new focus and different skills. The job is
not one of description, but design. It is not one of reading statutes and
interpreting them, but of writing them. It is not one of analyzing cases
and predicting results, but of constructing procedures and prescribing
rules which will reach the desired results.
Third, none of the present or proposed legislation on individual
employment rights serves the political and social value of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining provides a measure of industrial democracy by giving workers a voice in the decisions affecting their
working life. Employees' voice in legislation is so remote and weak it
provides little sense of participation, and court decisons are completely beyond their control. As we substitute reliance on legal regulation for reliance on collective bargaining, the task will severely test
our ingenuity and willingness to break out of old molds in finding answers to how we can construct a system of worker participation where
there is no collective bargaining.
It is no answer that employers recognize the need and value of
worker participation to increase productivity, improve quality, and reduce turnover. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of employers do not recognize the value of worker participation. Those who do
are so rare as to be newsworthy. Many personnel programs which
purport to provide workers a voice do not require management to listen to what it does not want to hear, much less act on it. Often, the
matters on which employees can speak are limited to matters of small
consequence. Few employers are prepared to share substantial prerogative with their employees.
It is important to point out that other countries have solved this
problem by providing by statute for the establishment in each workplace of a works council or employee committee, elected by the employees, to act as their representative. In Germany, for example, the
works council is given by statute codetermination rights on a wide
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range of matters, including hiring and transfer of employees, job classification and work assignments, work schedules and overtime, implementation of job training, and plans for adjusting the work force and
severance pay in cases of large scale layoffs and plant closings. In
France, Italy, Belguim, and the Netherlands, elected employee representative committees perform many of these same functions. In Scandinavia, these functions are performed by the local unions; no
statutory committees are needed because employees are 80-90%
organized.
The very mention of employee plant committees revives for unions
the specter of company unions, and employers immediately reject any
suggestion of sharing management prerogatives. However, where
there is no collective bargaining, the employees should have some
other avenue for making their voice heard. One of the premises of the
Wagner Act was that industrial democracy was an essential part of
political democracy and that the law should provide for democracy in
the workplace just as the constitution provides for it in government.
This premise is still valid, and we should search for ways to fulfill it.
If we shed our preconceptions, we can design a structure that will
meet this need.
CONCLUSION
I want to make crystal clear that I still believe the goals of the
Wagner Act are sound. Collective bargaining, with its grievance procedure and arbitration, is the best instrument for protecting individual
employee rights, achieving industrial democracy, and minimizing governmental intervention. Collective bargaining, where it is established
and accepted, has demonstrated that it can, and for most purposes has,
fulfilled those purposes.
We were not wrong to look to collective bargaining as the best
guardian of most individual employee rights. We are now beginning to
acknowledge the unwelcome fact that for most employees, collective
bargaining does not exist, and they have no guardian. This has motivated the judicial attacks on the employment at will doctrine and legislative initiatives to protect individual employees. There is now a
changing of the guard for those who are not protected by collective
bargaining. The prospect is that this process will continue through the
turn of the century. Society will increasingly rely on legal regulation
of employment relations. This will not be a precise systematic process,
but rather a patchwork of laws, regulations, and decisions at federal,
state, and local levels. The challenge will be to design those laws so as
to bring some coherence to the process, provide appropriate and effective remedies, and ultimately develop structures of employee representation for those not represented through collective bargaining.

